Maladaptive  Federalism: The Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives by Rossi, Jim
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 4
2014
"Maladaptive" Federalism: The Structural Barriers
to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives
Jim Rossi
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Jim Rossi, "Maladaptive" Federalism: The Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
1759 (2014)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol64/iss4/10
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
1759 
“Maladaptive” Federalism:  
THE STRUCTURAL BARRIERS  
TO COORDINATION OF STATE 
SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVES 
Jim Rossi† 
Abstract 
The federal government has been slow to confront problems such 
as climate change, but many states have adopted innovative 
approaches to addressing the impacts of using natural resources to 
produce energy, including aggressive regulation of carbon emissions 
and renewable energy standards. This Article questions whether 
celebration of these types of state initiatives as a form of “adaptive” 
federalism is premature. The Article identifies an emerging challenge 
that subnational regulation faces in the energy and environmental 
context—what I will call “maladaptive” federalism—and argues that 
federalism discussions need to account for its possibility. 
Part I highlights adaptive regulation as a form of federalism, 
echoing a vision for subnational regulation that many federalism 
scholars and policymakers have endorsed over the past two decades. 
Part II argues that policy choices by subnational units of 
government that fail to account for or consider these coordination 
benefits should not be celebrated as a form of adaptive federalism 
merely because they are state policy choices. I identify subnational 
recalcitrance (on inaction by states) and backlash (or reversing 
course) as two potential types of maladaptation, provide examples of 
each, and use these to illustrate the structural features of subnational 
governments that make maladaptation most likely.  
Part III evaluates the pro-adaptation tools that federal agencies 
can use to address the enactment costs of states taking maladaptive 
approaches. In certain contexts, such as in clean energy initiatives, 
focusing on enactment costs associated with the structure of state 
governments will be superior to federal policies that preempt 
subnational units of government altogether by making the policy 
choice for them. Such tools not only make maladaptation less likely; 
they also help to ensure that when a state does opt for a maladaptive 
policy path that it does so because it is making explicit tradeoffs in 
 
† Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. Versions of this Article 
were presented at workshops at Boston College Law School, Tulane 
University Law School, and Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. I am grateful to participants there and especially to Jonathan 
Adler, Brian Galle, and Amy Stein for comments.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
“Maladaptive” Federalism 
1760 
ways that are more likely to be welfare-enhancing and politically 
accountable. 
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Introduction 
This Article identifies an emerging challenge that subnational 
regulation faces in the energy and environmental context—what I will 
call “maladaptive” federalism—and argues that federalism discussions 
need to account for its possibility. What is known as “adaptive” 
federalism sees subnational units of government as effective 
institutions for promoting regulatory experimentation and solving 
regulatory problems, especially in the energy and environmental law 
arena.1 While the federal government has been slow to adopt climate 
change initiatives, many state governments have enacted innovative 
approaches to addressing the impacts of using natural resources to 
produce energy, including aggressive approaches to regulating carbon 
emissions and renewable energy standards.2 To name a few examples: 
more than 30 states have adopted Renewable Portfolio Standards  
1. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: 
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 
Minn. L. Rev. 1796 (2008) (arguing that an adaptive model should be 
utilized in the framework for environmental federalism). From what I 
can tell, this view was first advanced as an intergovernmental theory in 
Australia, by Bhajan Gewal at the James Cook University of North 
Queensland. Bhajan S. Grewal, Economic criteria for the assignment of 
functions in a federal system, in Towards Adaptive Federalism: A 
Search for Criteria for Responsibility Sharing in a Federal 
System 5 (Australian Advisory Council for Intergovernmental Relations 
ed., 1981).  
2. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1846–49, for examples of states 
leading climate change policy initiatives.  
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(RPSs), requiring a certain percentage of electric power sold to come 
from renewable sources;3 California has adopted comprehensive 
climate change legislation;4 and several states have been leaders in 
promoting renewable energy and clean energy initiatives, including 
smart grids.5  
Many environmental law policymakers and scholars celebrate 
adaptive federalism because subnational institutions can better adapt 
to unique geographic conditions and promote policy experimentation 
and its diffusion.6 Seeing environmental law advocates look to 
subnational governments seems surprising, given environmental law’s 
insistence on the superiority of national regulation in addressing 
jurisdictional spillover problems associated with pollution. Perhaps it 
is even odder to see environmental law scholars embrace subnational 
units of government in addressing a problem like climate change, 
where the harms are widely recognized to be global rather than local.7 
There is a simple pragmatism to this turn towards subnational  
3. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National 
RPS, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1339, 1375–79 (2010). See also Brannon P. 
Denning, Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1519 (2014) (providing a survey 
of a range of RPS programs and some of the constitutional challenges 
that they may present). 
4. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 10 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1097, 1099–1100 (2009) (asserting the significant climate 
change initiatives to come from California as examples of iterative 
federalism schemes).  
5. Texas, for example, has been a leader in promoting wind power and 
building infrastructure to encourage its development. See David A. 
King, Interregional Coordination of Electric Transmission and Its 
Impact on Texas Wind, 8 Tex. J. Oil, Gas & Energy L. 309, 310 
(2013). Joel Eisen has discussed the role of states in implementing smart 
grid initiatives. See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for 
the Smart Grid, 37 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2013). There are many 
other environmental/energy contexts where states have been leaders, 
such as building codes, appliance standards, and auto emissions 
standards. See Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide 
Products Revisited: Federalism, Green Building Codes, and Appliance 
Efficiency Standards, 34 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 335 (2010); Carlson, 
supra note 4, at 1115. 
6. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1801 (asserting that an adaptive 
model of federalism is an important advance). Adaptive federalism is 
also called “iterative” federalism. See Carlson, supra note 4, at 1099. 
Others refer to this as “dynamic” or “collaborative” federalism. See infra 
notes 15, 17, and accompanying text. 
7. See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action 
Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
579, 610 (2008) (asserting climate change is a global problem in 
analyzing federal regulation of it). 
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governments in environmental law: At the subnational level it is 
easier to pass new initiatives, making adaptive federalism a 
particularly attractive approach for policy innovation.  
Against the backdrop of federal legislative inaction—no doubt in 
part rooted in federal institutions that have held up legislation, such 
as the Senate—climate change policy initiatives have had more 
traction at the subnational level.8 State governments are closer and 
more reactive to their constituent stakeholders than the U.S. 
Congress, do not suffer from mass geographic diversity that plagues 
U.S. lawmaking, and may face fewer veto points than Congress. 
According to some, subnational regulatory initiatives may even be 
superior to federal legislation, which could potentially limit the space 
for state initiatives or hamper innovation and experimentation.9 
Beyond these benefits to adaptive federalism, environmental 
scholars have paid less attention to how subnational policies can 
produce coordination benefits beyond any individual state’s borders 
and what impact this has on federalism discussions. To take an 
example related to renewable energy, harmonized RPS standards 
across individual states produce spillover benefits for renewable 
project developers and others in the financing and contracting 
process.10 Planning for and allocating the costs of multistate project 
infrastructure such as transmission and power grid reliability also 
produces important benefits for renewable power projects, regardless 
of any particular jurisdiction.11 Of course, there are always positive 
externalities to the policy diffusion related to subnational innovation, 
but the coordination benefits I describe transcend the diffusion  
of ideas.  
This Article argues that, in many public goods contexts, that 
there are externalities that go beyond experimentation itself—benefits 
(and sometimes even costs) that receive almost no attention in the 
federalism literature. In contexts where adaptation produces positive 
policy externalities, federalism is challenged to account for the 
 
8. See Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is 
Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem 
and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 
38 Urb. Law. 1015, 1023–26 (2006) (asserting that economic and 
political factors provide an explanation for the success of local and state 
efforts in addressing climate change). 
9. See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1801 (stating that adaptive 
federalism would combat federal regulations that hamper state’s efforts); 
Jonathan H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal 
Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 
67, 70 (2007) (arguing that federal action can directly limit the 
effectiveness of state action).  
10. See infra notes 34, 36 and accompanying text.  
11. See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.  
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possibility that individual states can just as readily take positions 
that hobble or thwart the production of public goods as they can 
promote them. Specifically, the analysis of this Article explores 
whether there should be limits on a state or other subnational unit of 
government acting independently when this stands in the way of 
other states creating coordination benefits from an adaptive 
federalism program such as climate change or sustainable energy 
initiatives. 
Part I highlights adaptive regulation as a form of federalism, 
echoing a vision for subnational regulation that many federalism 
scholars and policymakers have endorsed over the past two decades. 
As Part I suggests, adaptive federalism does not embrace subnational 
regulation per se, but because it advances other values, such as 
promoting policy experimentation and its diffusion—the core value of 
adaptive federalism. Diffusion itself is a spillover benefit from 
adaptation, albeit a benefit that is indifferent to any particular 
institution’s policy choice. Beyond diffusion, I argue that in many 
contexts adaptation also produces other benefits related to the 
substance of policy—which can take the form of coordination benefits 
(positive externalities) of adaptation that spillover to the regional or 
national level.  
Part II argues that policy choices by subnational units of 
government that fail to account for or consider these coordination 
benefits should not be celebrated as a form of adaptive federalism 
merely because they are state policy choices. Structural features of 
state governments can contribute to the possibility of subnational 
governments failing to recognize these coordination benefits—what I 
characterize as “maladaptation.” I identify subnational recalcitrance 
(inaction by states) and backlash (reversing course) as two potential 
types of maladaptation, provide examples of each, and use these to 
illustrate the structural features of subnational governments that 
make maladaptation most likely.  
Preserving a role for states to dissent from trends and from 
inchoate national or regional policies is important, even essential, to 
federalism. However, that does not mean that federalism must be 
indifferent to every substantive state policy choice. Part III maintains 
that to the extent the potential for maladaptation subverts welfare-
enhancing coordination, it is an appropriate concern for regulators. I 
identify a variety of legal tools that regulators and courts can look to 
in order to address the decision costs of maladaptation and make it 
less likely, especially in contexts where national regulators have 
endorsed subnational trends or policy choices. These include 
substantive preemption by statute or regulation, explicit interstate 
entrenchment tools designed to promote adaptive regulatory 
commitments, and process preemption. Adaptive federalism may be 
mostly likely to flourish in situations where Congress has established 
direct enforcement “sticks” (such as in the context of the Clean Air 
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Act), but it is also an important regulatory approach even where a 
federal agency has no direct enforcement authority.  
Part III argues in favor of pro-adaptation tools that federal 
agencies can use to address the enactment costs of states taking 
maladaptive approaches. In certain contexts, focusing on enactment 
costs associated with the structure of state governments will be 
superior to federal policies that preempt subnational units of 
government altogether by making the policy choice for them. Such 
tools not only make maladaptation less likely; they also help to ensure 
that when a state does opt for a maladaptive policy path that it does 
so because it is making explicit tradeoffs in ways that are more likely 
to be welfare-enhancing and politically accountable. I identify the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC’s) Order 1000, 
which addresses transmission and cost allocation for renewable energy 
projects, as a lead example of how a federal agency can discourage 
maladaptation without preempting state policy choices.12  
The potential for maladaptation in state policy choices is a 
legitimate area of concern for regulatory federalism. Understanding 
the potential maladaptation in state lawmaking is important to 
identifying when subnational decisions will promote coordination and 
positive externalities, or conflicts between different policies can 
potentially get in the way. I conclude that paying attention to the 
decision costs of maladaptive subnational decisions provides an 
important alternative to the conventional options of leaving policy 
choices entirely to the whims of state politics or to Congress or federal 
regulators making the choices for states.  
I. Adaptive Federalism 
Adaptive federalism is the view that state and local governments 
can better experiment and conform their policies to the particular 
conditions that they face and the preferences of their citizenry. David 
Edelman and Kirsten Engel perceptively advocate for a version of 
adaptive federalism in solving problems associated with climate 
change and energy sustainability—an approach that would allow 
multiple jurisdictions to independently address the problem without 
ceding authority or limiting strategies.13 Environmental law is an 
especially likely candidate for such an approach, notwithstanding the 
existence of significant federal statutes and regulations regarding 
pollution. As William Buzbee has highlighted, major federal 
environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water 
Act envision state governments playing a major implementation and 
 
12. See infra Part III.C. 
13. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1801.  
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enforcement role that exceed a federal floor, or minimum regulatory 
standard.14  
Apart from the legal structure allowing for states to set stricter 
standards than the federal government, it is perhaps not surprising 
that adaptive federalism has many converts in the environmental law 
community—where some also refer to this approach as “dynamic,”15 
“iterative,”16 or “collaborative” federalism.17 The federal government, 
Congress in particular, has been steadfast in its inaction related to 
climate change. States, most notoriously California, have been far 
more aggressive innovators on this front. If one prefers more 
aggressive environmental approaches to solving problems related to 
climate change, state and local governments are a more fertile level of 
government for policy adoption.  
But adaptive federalism is not merely a convenient political 
strategy for pursuing a certain policy vision to address climate 
change. There are legitimate benefits to adaptive federalism that 
transcend any particular policy agenda on substantive issues such as 
the environment. Adaptive federalism is a serious theory of 
federalism, not just a political strategy. Although many different 
accounts of adaptive federalism have been advanced, these share 
emphasis on promoting policy experimentation and learning and the 
values of interjurisdictional competition and the advantages of 
subnational regulation. Less recognized is how adaptive federalism 
policies can mediate interstate coordination problems and create 
spillover benefits. In other words, where coordinated, adaptive 
federalism programs can produce some of the benefits of national 
regulation (by addressing interstate spillovers), without embracing a 
one-size-fits-all solution to problems such as climate change. 
 
14. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption 
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1576 (2007) 
(asserting that states can choose their own strategies using the federal 
law as a starting point). See Adler, supra note 9, at 70, for the argument 
that federal floors can adversely impact or effect the level of state 
regulation. 
15. See Hari Osofsky & Hannah Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 
Md. L. Rev. 773, 774 (2013) (advocating for a multidimensional 
federalism approach); see also Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits 
of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 Emory L.J. 159, 
162–63 (2006) (arguing for states to have the freedom to develop policy 
situations).  
16. Carlson, supra note 4, at 1099 (highlighting iterative features of 
environmental federalism). 
17. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 
54 Duke L.J. 795, 801, 843 (2005) (presenting a detailed case study of a 
collaborative federal-state approach to watershed regulation in 
California). 
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A. Policy Experimentation in Addressing Climate Change 
Justice Louis Brandeis famously praised state and local 
governments as “laboratories of democracy.”18 Climate change is 
widely recognized to be a global problem.19 Yet in the context of 
addressing the problems associated with climate change, the policy 
benefits of experimentation and subnational innovation related to 
climate change solutions can be significant. More than 30 states have 
established RPS standards to encourage the development of renewable 
energy.20 Many states have also regulated carbon emissions, most 
notably California, and nearly 20 states have established energy 
efficiency standards.21  
This kind of subnational innovation produces positive goods in 
the form of knowledge benefits and innovation in sustainable and 
renewable energy. The U.S. encompasses a vast body of land with 
varying environmental conditions, along with significant variations in 
the tastes and preference of citizens and economic conditions. Local 
decision makers will be better equipped with the knowledge and 
expertise to solve problems in ways that adapt to local circumstances. 
Climate change is widely recognized to be a global problem,22 but the 
most effective and cost-effective mechanisms for addressing its effects 
will vary significantly from place to place. That leaves state and local 
governments a significant role to play in formulating and 
implementing policy solutions to climate change or other 
environmental law problems.  
A good illustration of how adaptation can produce these benefits 
is the variations in geology and resources that produce opportunities 
for energy production, and understanding how that production will 
impact ecology and the environment. David Adelman and Kirsten 
Engel provide a range of examples of innovation that are dependent  
18. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (stating, “a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  
19. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of 
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1962 (2007) (asserting 
that subnational solutions are not the best way to combat global climate 
change).  
20. See Davies, supra note 3, at 1375–77 (providing data on the 36 states 
that have adopted Renewable Portfolio Standards); see also DSIRE: 
Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, RPS Data, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm (follow “DSIRE RPS Data 
Spreadsheet” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (containing the most 
recent state RPS data from March 2013).  
21. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 167–76 
(2011), for one snapshot of these various innovations. 
22. See Wiener, supra note 19, at 1962. 
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on resource allocation and also responsive to environmental concerns, 
including state adoption of standards and goals for renewable 
energy.23 David Spence has also recently made a compelling case for 
why states should retain significant authority related to the regulation 
of natural gas fracking activities and their effects.24  
Such experimentation can also produce the benefit of innovation. 
Ann Carlson asserts that state experimentation not only better 
matches the problems to the local knowledge needed to solve them, 
but that it also can produce better innovation.25 This kind of 
technological innovation may occur if state regulatory measures 
induce private investment in the development of technologies to meet 
local emissions controls26 or other requirements such as smart grid27 or 
energy efficiency standards.28 There are also positive externalities 
created by state innovation due to policy diffusion in the 
policymaking sphere. Both federal and state regulators can learn from 
each other where state and local governments have the flexibility to 
adapt in adopting and enforcing environment and energy standards. 
This learning can improve the overall quality regulation—a theory of 
federalism that others outside of environmental and energy law circles 
have referred to as “democratic experimentalism.”29  
B. Interjurisdictional Competition for Sustainable Energy 
But the benefits of adaptation go beyond facilitating diversity in 
matching problems to local knowledge and circumstances and 
promoting policy diffusion. The idea that states are better suited than 
the federal government to “adapt” to social problems such as climate  
23. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1848 (arguing that state action 
can feed back into encouraging federal action).  
24. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political 
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 432 (2013) 
(asserting there is no overriding national interest to regulating fracking 
activities because of the controversy surrounding fracking). 
25. See Carlson, supra note 4, at 1135–36 (using California as an example of 
a state utilizing private investment to encourage innovation and reduce 
emissions). 
26. Id.  
27. See Eisen, supra note 5, at 21 (asserting that private investment in 
innovating with the smart grid can be utilized in a dynamic federalism 
model).  
28. See Klass, supra note 5. 
29. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998) (“We call the 
overall system of public problem solving that combines federal learning 
with the protection of the interests of the federated jurisdictions and the 
rights of the individuals democratic experimentalism.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
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change is consistent with the idea of federalism as promoting a kind of 
interjurisdictional competition. As Ilya Somin writes: 
Whereas the theory of interstate diversity assumes merely that 
states are responsive to the preferences of citizen-voters already 
residing within their boundaries, the theory of interstate 
competition asserts that states actively compete with each other 
to attract new citizens, who can improve their lot through the 
power of “exit” rights. Conversely, states also strive to ensure 
that current residents will not depart for greener pastures 
offered by competitors. Citizens dissatisfied with state policy 
have the option not only of lobbying for changes but also of 
moving to another state that deliberately seeks to attract them 
with more favorable policies. To the benefits of political voice 
provided by interstate diversity, the possibility of interstate 
competition adds those of exit.30  
An adaptive approach to federalism in the context of energy and 
climate change policy nicely illustrates how interjurisdictional 
competition could work. From the perspective of citizens, living in 
states that use lower carbon sources of energy might have an impact 
on the health and well-being of citizens and their offspring. Relying on 
a diversity of sources to generate electricity, as RPS standards 
promote, might soften the impact of volatilities in energy prices 
introduced through world political and economic events. Moreover, 
living in a state that is better prepared to address the effects of 
climate change might reduce the costs of property or health insurance 
and better insulate citizens from the extreme effects of weather 
patterns, coastal sea rise and the like.  
Whether this kind of competition actually occurs in citizen 
decisions is the subject of much disagreement in the federalism 
literature.31 In contrast, there is considerable evidence that 
competition in state policy approaches has an effect on business 
decisions of firms in deciding where to locate plants and their 
operations.32 In the context of state sustainability initiatives, RPS 
standards are frequently touted as driving investments in energy 
development. There appears to be some anecdotal correlation between 
states with RPS standards and sustainable or green investment 
 
30. Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for 
Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 Geo. 
L.J. 461, 468 (2001). 
31. See generally, Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Federalism: A Survey 
of the Empirical Literature, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1669 (2014). 
32. Id. at 1683–84 (summarizing second-generation studies that show a 
meaningful effect of environmental regulation on the location of 
economic activity).  
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activities.33 Yet this correlation does not appear to be conclusive of 
causation, since many of the states with RPS standards also appear to 
be states that are already rich in the natural resources needed to 
produce renewable energy.34  
C. Mediating Interstate Coordination Problems 
Less appreciated is how adaptive federalism solutions can produce 
policy benefits beyond diffusion, innovation, and competition. Where 
states converge on similar policy approaches, they may be able to 
solve spillover problems on their own by coordinating regulatory 
approaches. Environmental and energy regulation provides an 
example of these kinds of coordination benefits. In environmental law, 
it is well-recognized that state emissions standards can lead to the 
reduction of cross-border air and water emissions. The sharing of 
enforcement resources and information can also assist states, and 
sometimes even federal regulators, in implementing and enforcing 
standards.  
In the energy context, the spillover benefits of coordination that 
flow from adaptive federalism are also significant. The benefits of a 
critical number of states coordinating their policy initiatives related to 
sustainable energy seem obvious where what is at issue are technical 
standards related to the interconnection of renewable sources with the 
grid or technologies such as smart meters. States are already working 
in this direction as they coordinate with private standard-setting 
organizations in the electric power industry.35 Standards such as RPS 
have also facilitated coordination in utilities offering standard offer 
contracts for renewable power projects; these kinds of contracts have 
been essential to providing the credible commitments for projects 
necessary to attract long-term financing.36 As state RPS standards 
 
33. See, e.g., Mindy Lubber, Protecting Renewable Portfolio Standards from 
Cynical Attacks, FORBES (March 19, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/mindylubber/2013/03/19/protecting-renewable-
portfolio-standards-from-cynical-attacks/. 
34. Magali A. Delmas & Maria J. Montes-Sancho, U.S. State Policies for 
Renewable Energy: Context and Effectiveness, 39 Energy Pol’y 2273, 
2282 (2011) (“While higher natural resources endowment can facilitate 
the adoption of policies that are not effective, some effective policies 
might be adopted in states with low resource potential . . . . [F]actors 
other than natural resources can predict successful renewable policies.”). 
35. See Eisen, supra note 5 (describing state-led process, but ultimately 
arguing in favor of a national-led initiative to set standards for 
interconnection and smart grids). 
36. Like TVA, many utilities subject to RPS standards operate in many 
states and, as RPS standards in the state in which they operate have 
proliferated, this has facilitated their offering standard offer contracts 
that provide power producers and consumers similar terms, reducing the 
costs of financing projects. TVA Generation Partners Program / Mid-
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have proliferated, one problem that has arisen is that state renewable 
energy credits differ across state regarding what counts as a renewable 
resource and how these are credited towards RPS goals; the 
availability of tradable renewable energy credits present a monitoring 
problem, presenting the opportunity for double counting or even 
fraud.37 Even absent any federal initiative or leadership relating to the 
issue, adaptive federalism approaches have facilitated the 
harmonization of renewable energy credits—coordination that ensures 
that the goals of RPS standards are not undermined.38 
Perhaps no issue in the energy industry illustrates the 
coordination benefits of adaptive federalism as vividly as does electric 
power transmission. The siting of electric power transmission lines is 
largely controlled by state regulators, who also bear direct 
responsibility for deciding who pays for the costs of new lines in retail 
rates. Adaptive federalism approaches to encouraging the 
development of new sources of electric power create shared 
opportunities and incentives for investment in new infrastructure. As 
multiple states in a particular region of the U.S. have developed a 
shared vision for the growth of renewable sources of electric power, 
there arises a need for new infrastructure to bring power supply to 
customers. For example, in the Midwest, multiple states have invested 
in promoting the development of wind energy, and share interests in 
seeing transmission expanded to accommodate transmitting wind 
energy to a larger customer base.39 This kind of coordination can 
diffuse and minimize many of the barriers that might otherwise exist 
in state siting of transmission lines, including holdout problems.  
These spillover benefits open up the door for better coordination 
of sustainability policies across states and improve the chances that 
any individual state’s climate change initiatives will be successful. In  
Sized Standard Offer, United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (Sept. 26, 2012), http://epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/ 
incentive/Regional%20%28AL,%20GA,%20KY,%20MS,%20NC,%20TN,
%20VA%29tvagenerationpartnersprogrammidsized.html (TVA’s stan-
dard offer contract). 
37. See Davies, supra note 3, at 1376–78, for a discussion about differences 
across states in accounting approaches for RECs. 
38. See Center for Energy Economics, Bureau of Economic Geology, 
University of Texas at Austin, Harmonization of Renewable Energy 
Credit (REC) Markets Across the U.S., Center for Energy 
Economics (Nov. 2009), http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/ 
transmission_forum/CEE_National_RECs_study.pdf. 
39. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate 
Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism 
Mismatch, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1801 (2012) (describing the need for 
coordination in state transmission siting decisions, especially to address 
the development of wind energy in the Midwest and Western United 
States). 
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this sense, coordination among state policies can help to solve regional 
(and even national) problems—even in instances where the federal 
government has not imposed a floor or any incentive for states to take 
initiative. For sustainable energy, the spillover coordination benefits 
of adaptive federalism may be just as significant as the more 
conventionally recognized benefits, such as experimentation and 
interjurisdictional competition. 
II. Federalism’s Potential for Maladaptation  
The adaptive federalism account above tells a very optimistic 
story about state regulation. But there is another side to the coin. A 
state acting independently can serve as a form of adaptation, 
especially when it produces some of the benefits described above. 
However, some of the same features of state and local governments 
that make adaptation attractive—such as the low costs of enacting 
laws—can also threaten or undermine it. Structural features of state 
governments may impede the ability of a state to recognize and weigh 
the interstate coordination benefits of its policy choice, producing the 
possibility of what I call “maladaptation.” For example, state limits 
on executive authority can limit the ability of governors or state 
agencies to take the lead in adopting adaptive policies in the first 
place. Even where a state has adopted an adaptive policy, such as an 
RPS standard, the ease of overcoming veto points in the state 
lawmaking process can just as easily lead a state to endorse parochial 
policies that fail to recognize the coordination benefits associated  
with adaptation.  
The potential for adaptation at the state and local government 
level is no doubt present. But so is a potential for maladaptation—
states acting in ways that thwart interstate coordination or other 
spillover associated with adaptive federalism. Conflating maladaptive 
forms of state regulation with adaptive federalism—as does the 
conventional account, which assumes states will always promote the 
goals of adaptive federalism merely by experimenting—is a conceptual 
and practical mistake. It masks important problems that policymakers 
must take into account for adaptive regulatory programs to succeed 
where there is a possibility of coordination benefits. I identify two 
types of maladaptation: recalcitrance, a type of state holdout 
problem, and backlash, or states reversing course to subvert 
sustainability initiatives of surrounding states.  
A. Maladaptive Recalcitrance 
Recalcitrance represents a classic form of government inaction. It 
occurs when a state or local unit of government makes no decision at 
all regarding a crucial issue of regional or national importance. 
California may have been a leader in adopting climate change policies, 
but other states such as West Virginia have not been quick out of the 
gate in addressing the impacts of carbon emissions. Failure to address 
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social problems in the first place is commonplace and occurs for a 
variety of reasons, including a deliberate judgment by policymakers 
that the benefits of acting do not justify the costs.  
Recalcitrance can be quite consistent with the features of adaptive 
federalism. This may occur if a state’s reasons for not acting relate to 
a policy innovation choice or a desire to learn from other states’ 
approaches. It is entirely understandable that some subnational units 
of government may prefer the status quo over approaches to 
regulation that have been adopted by neighboring jurisdictions or that 
are emerging as a national trend. It is legitimate for a state to make 
an explicit political choice to opt for the status quo, as many states 
have in the context of marijuana laws or (prior to national health care 
policies) in failing to adopt state-specific plans to address health care 
costs. Yet, recalcitrance is sometimes a product of structural limits on 
state’s making any decision at all; such structural limits can increase 
the costs of coordination for other states, thwart inter-jurisdictional 
competition, or preclude any consideration of spillover benefits of 
state policies. At the extreme, recalcitrance can represent an overt 
effort to thwart national regulatory goals, as may occur when a state 
or local government inaction precludes approval of an electric power 
transmission line that promotes coordination or creates interstate 
benefits, or if a state persistently fails to enforce environmental or 
health and safety regulations. Recalcitrance is especially likely to be 
maladaptive in the context of cooperative federalism initiatives—if for 
example, a state is resisting federal interference with its programs—
although as I argue, its scope is not limited to cooperative federalism 
and extends to other scenarios where adaptation produces positive 
externalities. 
By acting independently, a state may engage in inaction with 
respect to an issue related to climate change, favoring the status quo 
over innovations in sustainable energy. There are good reasons states 
may choose to do this, including poor renewable resource allocation 
for energy production (as may occur throughout parts of Southeastern 
United States) or a concern about the costs that sustainable energy 
initiatives may impose on consumers. These reasons may make 
recalcitrance legitimate, especially where a state has made a deliberate 
choice to favor the status quo. However, in some instances states may 
be recalcitrant not because of a deliberate choice, but because of 
structural limits on government action that impede any deliberate 
choice in the first place.  
A good example of this maladaptive form of recalcitrance is state 
holdouts in siting new transmission lines for electric power. In some 
states, state siting statutes limit proposals for new transmission lines 
to an in-state utility, foreclosing any possibility of an out-of-state 
utility proposing to build a line and also foreclosing any possibility of 
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a non-utility developer proposing a line.40 For example, in Arkansas 
an administrative law judge recently chose a transmission line route 
that would have relocated a line through Missouri; however the line’s 
proponent, a utility operating in Arkansas, lacked retail customers 
and operations in Missouri and thus may be ineligible to apply for 
eminent domain to build the line.41 Even in states that might allow 
for a broader range of transmission line developers to propose to build 
lines, many state regulators are limited in considering the impact of a 
line on in-state residents and are not allowed to consider the broader 
benefits a new line might create for the reliability and efficiency of the 
grid regionally.42 Arizona regulators, for example, took a narrow 
approach to considering the benefits of a new line, refusing to approve 
a transmission line that would allow for the export of low carbon 
emission power to Southern California.43 Arizona regulators nixed the 
proposed transmission line calling the project a “230-mile extension 
cord.”44 The limited legal authority of many state siting statutes 
means that in many instances regulators cannot even act on 
applications to build transmission lines that would relieve congestion 
on the grid and open up new markets for renewable energy sources, 
especially wind power.  
Similar stories may perhaps be told about state regulators failing 
to implement cooperative federalism programs where they lack 
enforcement authority, or about states refusing to pass implementing 
legislation for initiatives related to the implementation of federal 
health care laws or authorizing cooperation with federal immigration 
policies. It is important, of course, to distinguish maladaptive 
recalcitrance from a state making a deliberate choice to act 
independently to support the status quo. What makes recalcitrance 
maladaptive is the institutional features of state governments that 
thwart any effort to evaluate benefits of status quo vis-à-vis the 
alternatives. For example, the limited siting statutes for electric power 
transmission avoid placing any political choice on a state’s regulatory 
agenda at all. Recalcitrance can become maladaptive when it begins 
to undermine other adaptive federalism goals, especially when it 
strategically increases the costs of interstate coordination or attempts 
to thwart any inter-jurisdictional competition by attempting to  
40. Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed 
Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and 
Regional Considerations, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 705, 719–21 (2010). 
41. See Jeffrey Tomich, “Very Real” Tension Between Grid Operators, 
State Regulators on Display in Ark. Siting Case, Energy & Env’t 
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059994595. 
42. Brown & Rossi, supra note 40, at 721–26. 
43. Id. at 725. 
44. Tomich, supra note 41. 
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impose one state’s approach onto other states in a region. As the 
example of state holdouts in transmission siting illustrates, a core 
problem is that state inaction may work to benefit a few at the 
expense of the many in ways that are not welfare-enhancing and that 
thwart the kind of interstate coordination needed to solve some 
regulatory problems. When this occurs, it should not be celebrated as 
a form of adaptive federalism but should be recognized as 
maladaptation.  
B. Maladaptive Backlash 
Another variation of maladaptive federalism is state or local 
regulatory backlash. Of course, reversing or diluting a previous policy 
course may occur for good reasons, including a state’s assessment that 
the costs of a previous choice do not justify the benefits. For example, 
states may legitimately adopt a moratorium on activities such as 
fracking or limit a state agency’s jurisdiction—completely reversing 
the previous regulatory status quo—especially where there is a need 
to take some time to learn about benefits, or because a decision has 
been made that the benefits do not justify the costs. States may also 
whittle away at programs, diluting previous regulatory priorities. 
However, what makes reversal or dilution of policy choices 
maladaptive is the low cost of their enactment, given limits on veto 
points in adopting policies at the state and local level.45 States 
legislatures may, for example, reverse adaptive federalism policies for 
reasons related to symbolic political values or as an effort to thwart 
regional innovation, with little or no serious assessment of 
jurisdictional or regional benefits. This kind of backlash may be 
common in cooperative federalism programs, where states resist 
federal regulatory encroachment; backlash also presents a potential for 
maladaptation in contexts where there is no federal regulation at all—
as where a state with a stand-alone regulatory program rapidly 
changes course without any serious evaluation of the program.  
A lead example this Article discusses is the national movement to 
repeal and dilute clean energy standards, also known as renewable 
portfolio requirements (RPSs). As is argued above, state initiatives 
like RPS standards advance adaptive federalism goals, such as  
45. Some of these limits are a byproduct of the simple fact that subnational 
units of government are smaller and more likely to be responsive to 
interest groups, which also face fewer collective action obstacles at the 
state or local level than they may face at the national level. See The 
Federalist No. 10 (Madison). Other features, however, relate to the 
state lawmaking process, which does not generally face as many 
obstacles in law adoption as does the U.S. Congress. The highest profile 
example of course is the adoption of direct democracy initiatives in 
many states. See Caroline J. Tolbert & Daniel A. Smith, Representation 
and Direct Democracy in the United States, 42 Representation 25 
(2006). 
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coordination. But RPS standards promote sources of energy that are 
more expensive to produce than energy from fossil fuel-fired plants 
and, not surprisingly, have also come under attack for imposing costs 
on consumers. This has led to a backlash effort to repeal or scape 
back RPS initiatives in many of the more than thirty states that have 
adopted them.46  
Nationally, the push to repeal state RPS’s is being driven by the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a group that stresses 
free-market views and drafts legislation supporting its positions.47 The 
organization has drafted model legislation, dubbed the Electricity 
Freedom Act,48 aimed at repealing state renewable energy mandates 
across the country.49 The model legislation takes the position that 
wind and solar power are too expensive and unreliable, and that 
requiring utilities to use renewable energy threatens grid reliability 
and ultimately increases the cost of doing business through rate 
increases or higher taxes.50  
This model legislation is influencing RPS repeal initiatives in 
more than a dozen states, with over forty bills to repeal or cut-back 
within the scope of RPS standards considered by state legislatures in 
2013.51 For example, former Duke Energy engineer, current ALEC 
member, and current North Carolina Representative Mike Hager was 
the lead sponsor of the HB 298 proposal seeking repeal of the North 
 
46. U.S. efforts to repeal RPS standards are not unique, and echo repeal 
efforts to repeal or scale back renewable energy requirements that have 
occurred in Europe and elsewhere in the world. See Stephen Castle, 
Europe, Facing Economic Pain, May Ease Climate Rules, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 22, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/ 
business/international/european-union-lowers-ambitions-on-renewable-
energy.html?_r=0. 
47. ALEC counts among its members some of the most powerful fossil fuel 
energy corporations, including ExxonMobil, Koch Industries, Duke 
Energy and Peabody Energy, the country’s largest coal producer. ALEC 
Corps., http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Corporations 
(last visited March 3, 2014).  
48. See Be Alerted: ALEC Prioritizes Renewable Energy for Next Year, 
Sustainable Bus. (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:27 AM), http://www.sustainable 
business.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/24245. 
49. See Tiffany Germain & Matt Kasper, The Loophole That’s Letting 
Conservatives Manipulate Renewable Energy Standards, Climate 
Progress (Mar. 4, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/ 
2013/03/04/1662051/hydropower-renewable-energy-standards/. 
50. Be Alerted, supra note 48. 
51. See Maria Gallucci, Renewable Energy Standards Target of Multi-
Pronged Attack, InsideClimate News (Mar. 19, 2013), https:// 
insideclimatenews.org/print/24712 (“In total, 42 separate efforts are 
wending their way through legislatures and courts in more than two 
dozen states. . . .”). 
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Carolina RPS - a proposal based on ALEC’s model legislation.52 North 
Carolina’s RPS, enacted in 2007, requires 12.5% of electricity from 
investor-owned utilities to come from renewable sources by 2021.53 A 
bill introduced in 2013, House Bill 298, titled the Affordable and 
Reliable Energy Act,54 proposed to fully repeal North Carolina’s RPS. 
The proposed bill suggested the state RPS is a “wasteful, uneconomic, 
and inefficient” use of energy.55 Perhaps indicative of a strong fossil-
fuel industry lobbying influence, surviving text to the current RPS 
law targeted by House Bill 298 includes provisions allowing utilities to 
charge their ratepayers to recover compliance costs from the clean 
energy requirements.56 
Such RPS repeal efforts have had a high profile. They have not 
generally succeeded for a variety of reasons.57 Yet they continue to be 
proposed and considered.58 Even where outright repeals have not been 
passed into law by state legislature several states have used the 
opportunity to reassess and, in some instances, substantially dilute 
existing RPS standards. There are several other examples of potential 
backlash regarding RPS standards, including: expansion of the 
definition of renewable sources to reduce RPS quotas, to include 
hydro or other conventional sources, to introduce multiplier effects for 
favored sources, or repeal of state biofuel standards.59  
 
52. See Connor Gibson, Duke Energy & Koch Brothers Aim to Kill Clean 
Energy in North Carolina, Greenpeace Blogs, http://green 
peaceblogs.org/2013/03/14/alec-bill-to-kill-nc-clean-energy-law-surfaces-
koch-fronts-and-duke-energy-behind-the-curtains/.  
53. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.8 (2007). 
54. H.B. 298, Sess. 2013 (N.C. 2013). 
55. Id.  
56. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.8(h)(4) (2007). 
57. See generally Brad Plumer, State Renewable-Energy Laws Turn Out to 
be Incredibly Hard to Repeal, Wash. Post: Wonkblog (Aug. 8, 2013, 
3:52 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/ 
08/08/state-renewable-energy-laws-turn-out-to-be-really-hard-to-repeal/ 
(discussing the difficulty of repealing state renewable energy laws and 
reasons for such difficulty). 
58. See, e.g., Jeffrey Tomich, In Kansas, Renewable Energy Standard Again 
Under Attack, Midwest Energy News (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www. 
midwestenergynews.com/2014/01/24/in-kansas-renewable-energy-
standard-again-under-attack/.  
59. See Katherine Heriot Hoffer & Jeff Lyng, The Real RPS Story Is Not 
Rollback, Advanced Energy Perspectives (Jul. 11, 2013, 5:41 PM), 
http://blog.aee.net/aee/bid/316387/the-real-rps-story-is-not-rollback 
(describing the most common policy initiative adopted by state 
legislatures regarding RPS standards in 2013 as “expansion in the 
definitions of eligible resources” including the additions of hydroelectric 
power in the RPS standards in Connecticut and Montana). 
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Like recalcitrance, backlash should not be automatically 
celebrated as a form of adaptive federalism, especially when it 
undermines innovation at the state level or efforts by states to 
coordinate renewable and sustainable energy initiatives. The concern 
is that some backlash initiatives are motivated by efforts to increase 
the costs of interstate coordination or thwart others’ innovations and 
pose significant negative externalities on those outside of the state 
that is reversing its previous initiatives. At the core, concerns with 
backlash are difficult to identify and probably would require some 
assessment of what is motivating a state’s lawmaking efforts, but that 
does not mean that indifference towards state efforts is required  
by federalism.  
III. Addressing Maladaptation 
The coordination challenges presented by adaptive federalism 
arise because state-led initiatives can create both positive and 
negative externalities. Positive externalities may arise where one state 
takes the lead but other states hold out from addressing a problem 
because they can benefit from the leading state’s regulatory program. 
There is nothing wrong with positive externalities per se, but their 
existence may undermine the incentives for some states to take 
initiative in the first instance. Negative externalities arise when one 
state’s initiatives impose costs outside of that particular jurisdiction 
that undermine other states’ initiatives. For example, negative 
externalities may result from state-led cap and trade initiatives, due 
to carbon leakage.60 Similarly, as Lincoln Davies has highlighted, state 
RPS programs can impose monitoring costs on other states, as the 
need to evaluate out-of-state renewable energy production becomes 
important to a workable renewable energy credit trading program.61  
To the extent that maladaptation presents a problem for climate 
change and sustainability initiatives, a challenge for regulators is how 
to minimize maladaptation without a) decreasing the space for 
independent state regulatory initiatives, or b) launching into a futile 
exercise in attempting to determine the intent or purposes of state 
regulators. The best tools for facilitating adaptive federalism would 
leave sufficient space for independent state decisions to flourish and 
innovate in ways that enhance social welfare, without requiring 
federal agencies or courts to assess the intent or purpose of 
subnational regulators on a case-by-case basis. The analysis presented 
in this Article favors entrenchment tools that are attentive to the 
enactment costs of maladaptation, rather than outright preemption. 
 
60. See Wiener, supra note 19, at 1966–73 (discussing state level actions and 
carbon leakage). 
61. See Davies, supra note 3, at 1378–79. 
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This kind of approach leaves states the opportunity to evolve 
independently, as adaptive federalism envisions, while also allowing 
the federal government a role in setting an agenda and in steering 
policy objectives. Climate change and sustainability initiatives provide 
a particularly fertile opportunity for the federal government to play 
this role.  
A. Conventional Federal Tools for Discouraging Maladaptation 
The two most common tools used by the federal government to 
address the coordination issues presented by adaptive federalism 
solutions are the substantive preemption of state law and the 
provision of monetary incentives. In the end, however, the type of 
preemption in most environmental statutes does not solve the need to 
address coordination problems among state regulatory standards, 
implementation and enforcement approaches. Cooperative federalism 
programs, such as many environmental statutes that rely on backup 
penalties imposed by the federal government, do not necessarily solve 
interstate coordination problems presented by adaptive federalism 
initiatives. Indeed, in contexts where such programs do not exist—
such as in the standards for development of renewable energy—state 
regulators are largely left to their own devices in developing, 
implementing and enforcing regulatory standards, such as  
RPS programs. 
Expansive federal preemption, such as field preemption of a 
regulatory area or express preemption of a state’s regulatory 
initiatives, would avoid the need for state regulation of an activity 
altogether. Where the federal government completely “preempts” a 
certain regulatory area, it leaves states little ability to decide 
regulatory programs on their own, and thus may reject adaptive 
federalism solutions to regulatory problems. In the environmental and 
energy law contexts, such preemption is rare, and is usually 
accomplished through express rather than field preemption.62  
 
62. While rare, such preemption is not extinct. Section 209(d) of the Clean 
Air Act prohibits states from adopting “any standard relating to the 
control of emissions from new motor vehicle[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) 
(2006). There are exceptions to this rule. See Carlson, supra note 4, at 
1109 (discussing California’s request for waiver of the CAA’s one-size-
fits-all standard for motor vehicles); see also Jonathan H. Adler, 
Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate Federalism, 17 
Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 443, 462–64 (2008) (arguing in favor 
of a general waiver provision for environmental law, similar to 
California’s fuel waiver provision in the CAA). Other preemption 
provisions can be found in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2012), and the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2617 (2012). 
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In contrast to this kind of preemption, many federal 
environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act63 and Clean Water 
Act,64 establish “floor” regulatory standards.65 Such standards allow 
states significant flexibility in enforcing federal standards and 
pursuing their own emissions standards over and above the federal 
minimum.66 Elsewhere, a co-author and I have argued that this kind 
of “floor” preemption should serve as a model for energy as well as 
environmental law.67 While floor preemption may leave states 
considerable leeway to pursue their own regulatory priorities, floor 
preemption does not necessarily solve the coordination challenges 
presented by adaptive federalism. Indeed, to the extent it leave states 
space to decide what standards and implementation programs to 
allow, it may even encourage the kinds of independent state decisions 
that prevent maladaptive coordination problems.  
Independent of preemption, there may be opportunities for the 
federal government to solve coordination problems through the 
provision of regulatory carrots (typically monetary benefits) or the 
imposition sticks (penalties). Although the availability of carrots may 
depend on national resources, there may be opportunities for federal 
regulators to offer states incentives to coordinate and share 
information in developing and enforcing regulatory standards. Some 
cooperative federalism programs draw on such “carrots,” especially 
where the federal government offers fiscal incentives for states to 
cooperate. As Brian Galle has observed, the political process has a 
tendency to overproduce carrots.68 Still, the availability of “carrots” 
depends on the federal budget, and the distribution of dollars can 
raise significant conditional funding and commerce clause problems 
(e.g., health care). Even if funding for coordinated solutions were 
 
63. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2006). 
64. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).  
65. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 14, at 1565–66. 
66. For a skeptical argument regarding the ability of floor preemption to 
improve emissions standards, see generally Adler, supra note 9. 
67. See Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy 
Floors, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1283 (2013). 
68. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the 
Choice of Price Instruments, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 797, 797 (2012). Galle 
identifies a range of reasons for the overproduction of carrots by 
government, id. at 844, including the congressional budget process, but 
he also observes that the overproduction of carrots at the subnational 
level may be especially likely due to inter-jurisdictional competition 
among states. Id. at 841–42. Some programs that are embraced as forms 
of adaptive federalism operate as carrots, and if these are overproduced 
it may be important to retain space for reconsideration or repeal of such 
programs—an approach that is consistent with the enactment cost 
approach made in this section. 
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available, at a minimum, there are structural limits on what the 
federal government can do in making carrots contingent on states 
adopting particular policy approaches.69 
Stick approaches, such as penalties for noncompliance with a pre-
articulated standard, have worked well in the context of 
environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act.70 However, these 
also depend on Congress giving federal agencies direct or backup 
enforcement authority—and in many areas of energy and 
environmental regulation there is no such federal enforcement 
mechanism. Absent enforcement sticks, which exist in some 
cooperative federalism programs, it is not clear how well adaptive 
federalism works—and it seems to be precisely these kinds of contexts 
where maladaptation can present problems for coordinated interstate 
solutions to regulatory programs. 
B. State-Led Efforts to Discourage Maladaptation  
State-led efforts can address coordination problems, even absent 
any kind of preemption or monetary incentives on the part of the 
federal government. A good example of a bottom-up regional effort to 
try to address coordination problems in the context of climate change 
is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeastern 
U.S.—“a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions 
from the power sector.”71 RGGI has not only led to a market-based 
trading initiative, but has facilitated greater coordination of RPS 
standards and other sustainability initiatives among its member 
states, helping to entrench and strengthen state-led initiatives.72 
RGGI is a voluntary initiative negotiated by the governors of its 
member states; although its members have agreed to treat emissions 
reductions as binding, it has no sovereign authority, and all authority 
is vested entirely within its member states.73 Similarly voluntary 
 
69. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After 
Sebelius, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1003 (2014). 
70. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2006). 
71. See Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/. 
72. For a discussion of how RGGI policies interact with state RPS 
standards, see Robert C. Grace, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
Moves Forward—What Does It Mean for Wind Power, New England 
Wind F., http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/newengland/policy_ 
rggi.asp. 
73. See Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI, Inc., Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/rggi. 
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initiatives to address climate issues have developed among western 
and midwestern states.74  
States might also potentially draw on more formal arrangements 
to coordinate and address spillover problems with sustainability 
initiatives. Interstate agreements could allow states to create binding 
and enforceable agreements, but under the Constitution these require 
the consent of the U.S. Congress.75 In 2005 Congress amended the 
Federal Power Act to authorize three or more contiguous states to 
enter into an interstate compact that establishes regional siting 
agencies for electric power transmission and prohibited FERC from 
using its preemptive backstop authority over state siting operating 
under such compacts.76 As Robin Craig has argued, interstate 
compacts present an opportunity to solve many of the interstate 
coordination problems associated with the expansion of electric power 
transmission facilities; although FERC itself may not be able to 
preempt state siting procedures, compacts themselves may prove 
helpful in using preemption in overcoming state holdout problems.77 
However, such compacts have been slow to form; despite widespread 
use of interstate compacts in addressing regional issues such as water 
and port management, no interstate compacts have been formed to 
address electric power transmission issues—though states are 
beginning to consider the possibility.78  
Short of state-led initiatives of formal compacts, voluntary 
industry arrangements may also help to solve some of the 
coordination challenges presented by adaptive federalism programs. 
Voluntary initiatives have no doubt played a significant, albeit 
underappreciated, role in environmental regulation, alongside federal 
and state-led initiatives.79 In the context of energy and sustainability 
initiatives, private initiatives have also been significant mechanisms 
 
74. See DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, 
supra note 19 (summarizing multi-state climate initiatives). 
75. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. 
76. Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 1221(i), Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 
(codified as 16 U.S.C. § 824(p)(i) (2012)). 
77. Robin K. Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and 
Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 
81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 771, 824–28 (2010). 
78. See Jim Malewitz, States Weigh Compact to Bolster Energy Grid, 
STATELINE (July 26, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/ 
stateline/headlines/states-weigh-compact-to-bolster-energy-grid-
85899493041. 
79. See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental 
Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 129 (2013) (discussing the value 
of “private activities as a discrete new model of environmental 
governance”).  
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for solving interstate coordination problems. Some of these initiatives 
have included industry-wide certification of technical standards for 
smart grid and transmission operation80 as well as private initiatives 
certifying renewable energy credits for RPS programs.81 In addition, 
although voluntary arrangements such as power pools have played a 
major role in managing interstate power markets for decades,82 
beginning in the 1990’s interstate regional transmission operators 
(RTOs) began to form as voluntary organizations comprised of 
utilities owning transmission lines.83 RTOs, which operate subject to 
the regulatory approval of FERC, have filled an important regulatory 
gap by helping private firms to mediate the coordination challenges 
presented by independent state regulatory initiatives—in ways that 
neither state nor federal authorities have been able to mediate on 
their own.  
C. Diffusing Maladaptation by Addressing Enactment Costs 
Adaptive federalism approaches may thrive in contexts where 
federal regulators have sticks at their disposal to steer states towards 
a certain regulatory vision. A good example is how federal 
environmental regulators can recognize certain state energy efficiency 
initiatives in implementing its new carbon emissions regulation under 
section 111(d) of the Clean Act Act, or how a state may opt out of 
these flexible approaches in favor of imposition of stricter emissions 
requirements by the EPA (which ultimately may serve as a form of 
penalty for states not adopting energy efficiency or RPS standards).84 
However, even where federal regulators lack any authority to impose 
standards directly onto the states, federal regulators may still have 
 
80. For an excellent discussion of these industry-led efforts, see Eisen, supra 
note 5, at 29–31.  
81. See Green-e, Renewable Energy Certificates 101, Green-e, 
http://www.green-e.org/learn_recs_101.shtml (providing background 
information about one such program, called Renewable Energy 
Certifications (RECs)). 
82. Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Markets for Power: 
An Analysis of Electric Utility Deregulation 4–8 (1983) 
(describing the role that private pooling arrangements played in 
promoting reliability standards in the electric power industry during the 
1960’s and 1970’s). 
83. See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System 
Operators (ISO), Federal Energy Regulation Commission, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2014) (describing the formation of RTOs and ISOs). 
84. See Nathan Richardson, Playing Without Aces: Offsets and the Limits 
of Flexibility Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, 42 ENVTL. L. 735, 
774 (2012) (discussing the options states have for flexible environmental 
policy). 
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tools at their disposal to discourage maladaptation—specifically by 
paying attention to the enactment costs associated with the state 
lawmaking process that produces adaptive federalism initiatives. 
Energy law provides an example of how federal regulators can do this.  
Federal or regional regulation can discourage the kinds of 
maladaption that are most likely to be welfare-reducing or present 
accountability problems by being attentive to the enactment costs 
associated with the lawmaking process that produces subnational 
maladaptation. This can be done through applying implied 
preemption doctrine to reduce the costs of adopting adaptive 
programs and increasing the costs of maladaptation without the 
federal government making a policy choice on behalf of a state. 
Recalcitrance can be addressed by lowering the enacting costs of 
subnational adaptation—as with federal statutes to authorize 
governors or state agencies to act, even where state legislatures have 
not authorized them to do so or have explicitly limited their 
authority. Backlash can be addressed by increasing the costs of state 
repealing regulatory approaches that create positive externalities; this 
can be done if federal regulators endorse state policies that produce 
national or regional benefits without explicitly adopting them as a 
one-size-fits-all solution.  
Federal agencies may also possess tools to decrease the costs of 
states taking adaptive approaches to problems related to climate 
change in the first place. One of the barriers to states approving 
transmission lines is the perception that state executive officers often 
do not possess the power to approve transmission lines for the 
interstate power market absent state legislative authorization—a 
policy that gives the status quo of no legislative authorization a 
virtual veto point over any approval of new transmission lines.85 In 
the federal spending context, Roderick Hills has argued in favor of 
“dissecting the state” by using federal preemption to authorize 
municipal governments and counties to accept federal dollars even 
absent state legislative authorization.86 Similarly, the use of implied 
preemption based on the Federal Power Act, which authorizes FERC 
to set just and reasonable rates87 and to promote reliability in 
 
85. See Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting in Deregulated Wholesale Power 
Markets: Re-Imagining the Role of Courts in Resolving Federal-State 
Siting Impasses, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 315, 332–38 (2005) 
(offering a proposal to deal with “recalcitrant state legislatures”). 
86. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to 
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1999). 
87. FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric 
energy in interstate commerce,” and over the “sale of electric energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce,” and over “all facilities for such 
transmission or sale of electric energy.” Federal Power Act § 201, 16 
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interstate power markets,88 could be used as a mechanism to preempt 
state separation of powers limitations on executive, municipal 
government or county approval over transmission lines.89 Such an 
approach might consider non-legislative actors as presumptively 
authorized to consider applications by non-utilities or utilities from 
outside of that particular jurisdiction, or require them to take into 
account broader national concerns in refusing or denying siting 
applications.90 Such preemption could be constructed or a state 
legislature could explicitly pass a law to the contrary, overriding any 
federal authorization for a state regulator to act, but this would occur 
through a deliberate choice, not by merely adhering to the status quo. 
By preempting state separation of powers limitations on the ability of 
state regulators to consider siting applications or to take into account 
broader benefits, federal regulators could reduce the enactment costs 
associated with states implementing adaptive federalism solutions, 
enabling a lawmaking process at the state level that would promote 
greater interstate coordination. This kind of approach to reducing the 
costs of adaptive federalism approaches to energy and environmental 
issues can also be used to empower governors, mayors and other 
executive officials to take into account climate change and 
sustainability goals in their policy initiatives.91  
In the context of adaptive federalism programs that have been 
adopted by individual states but are challenged by backlash at the 
state level, such as with repeal of RPS standards,92 federal regulators 
also have opportunities to address enactment costs and discourage 
maladaptive approaches by states. Where state regulators have 
adopted adaptive federalism measures that produce national or 
regional benefits but attempt to dilute or repeal them, federal 
regulators can discourage maladaptive approaches through regulatory 
measures that are attentive to the enactment costs associated with 
regulatory change at the state level. Federal regulators can do so by 
 
U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012). For the sections providing for FERC’s rate 
authority, see Federal Power Act §§ 205–06, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d–824e 
(2012).  
88. Section 215 gives FERC authority to promote grid reliability. Federal 
Power Act § 215, 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2012). 
89. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
90. Congress authorized FERC having backstop preemptive authority over 
state siting approval of transmission lines in limited geographic areas in 
2005, but courts have scaled back on FERC’s authority and the agency 
has never exercised it. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 39, at 1858 
(discussing the history of “federal backstop siting authority”). 
91. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 44–58 and accompanying text (discussing RPS repeal 
initiatives). 
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endorsing state or regional policy goals or build these into national or 
regional regulatory priorities, thereby increasing the enactment costs 
of state backlash.  
An example of this in the energy context is FERC’s landmark 
Order No. 1000, adopted in 2011.93 Order No. 1000 amends the 
transmission planning and cost allocation requirements that FERC 
previously established in Order No. 89094 to require coordinated 
regional transmission planning, including the consideration of state 
public policy requirements in the planning process.95 In addition, 
Order No. 1000 addresses how the costs of new transmission projects 
are paid for by requiring each regional or interregional plan to include 
a method for allocating costs of producing the proposed new 
transmission facility that comports with some basic principles.96 
Regional transmission planning is intended to resolve a region’s 
transmission needs “more efficiently or cost-effectively than solutions” 
planned by each individual public utility transmission provider—as 
has historically occurred.97 Order No. 1000 requires the local and 
regional transmission planning process to account for transmission 
needs driven by what FERC calls “Public Policy Requirements”98—
defined to include state enacted statutes and regulations for the 
electric power industry.99 Renewable portfolio standards are an 
important example of the types of state laws that would affect 
transmission needs, and must be considered when creating the 
regional plan.100   
93. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000), 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 
(Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). In a consolidated 
challenge to Order No. 1000 by several state regulators and utility 
industry stakeholders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
upheld FERC’s rules. See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, __ F.3d __ 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (12-1232). 
94. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission 
Service (Order No. 890), 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007) (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 37) (requiring each public utility 
transmission provider to have a coordinated, open, and transparent 
regional transmission planning process). 
95. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission 
Owning and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000-A), 77 Fed. 
Reg. 32,184, 32,189 (May 31, 2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) 
(discussing the scope of Order No. 1000). 
96. See id. at 32,184 (affirming Order No. 1000’s requirements). 
97. Id. at 32,202. 
98. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000), 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,871. 
99. Id. at 49,845. 
100. See id. at 49,919.  
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One federalism objection101 some in the industry raise with Order 
No. 1000 is based on the principle that the federal government cannot 
commandeer state legislatures and executives to pursue federal 
interests.102 More specifically, industry commentators in the 
rulemaking process have claimed that FERC cannot require public 
utility transmission providers to consider the impacts of public 
policies under federal and state laws and regulations. Boiled down, the 
concern is that consideration of regional planning based on public 
policy requirements can produce a result where one state’s public 
policy agenda dominates the others. If one state’s policy dominates 
the outcome of the regional transmission planning process, the policies 
of that state in effect could be forced onto customers in other states 
within that region, regardless of whether they have voted against such 
a policy in their home state.103 This disconnect between who 
establishes public policy and who is affected by it, critics maintain, 
creates a potential accountability problem. Regional planning could 
allow one state to impose costs on consumers in another state 
“without sufficient democratic or procedural checks and balances.”104 
Of course, RTOs are tasked with reconciling and prioritizing 
competing state policies, yet they are insulated from the political 
process. Citizens who disagree with the regional plan, or the Public 
Policy Requirements that affect the plan’s creation, may not be able 
to vote to change the plan if the officials shaping the plan are in 
another state or are not in an elected position. In the worst scenario, 
the Order might permit one state’s public policy agenda to adversely 
affect electricity prices in another state that does not share that 
 
101. FERC Order Nos. 1000, 1000-A, and 1000-B collectively only mention 
“federalism” in Order No. 1000-A’s part III.A.1.e. See Transmission 
Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities (Order No. 1000-A), 77 Fed. Ref. at 32,216 (“Several 
petitioners express concerns . . . that the requirements raise federalism 
issues.”). Over and over again in its order FERC claims that nothing in 
the order preempts state authority, but to the extent FERC’s order 
envisions the agency approving cost allocation mechanisms, this may 
preempt state retail rate decisions. See id. at 32,219 (“We disagree . . . 
that Order No. 1000’s requirements regarding Public Policy 
Requirements raise significant federalism issues.”). 
102. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177–78 (1992) 
(holding that state sovereignty constrains federal mandates); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (confirming this anti-
commandeering principle).  
103. See Request for Clarification and Rehearing at 10, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 
(2011) (No. RM10-23-000) (arguing that regional regulation raises 
federalism concerns). 
104. Id. 
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agenda.105 In effect, this means the Order permits the federal 
government to require state taxpayers to subsidize the policy goals of 
other states that are in no way politically accountable to the 
burdened state.  
Ultimately, however, Order 1000 changes the planning process, 
and does not mandate any specific outcome. FERC adopted these 
planning requirements to help ensure that transmission service is 
offered at just and reasonable rates, and not to infringe on state 
jurisdiction.106 On rehearing, FERC clarified that the Order only 
requires consideration of the Public Policy Requirements; it does not, 
however, mandate that these requirements be fulfilled, whether they 
are RPS policies or other energy efficiency or climate change 
measures.107 Moreover, it characterizes the Public Policy Requirements 
as “facts” that can affect the need for transmission services, and that 
merely need to be considered.108 Of course, in implementation, FERC 
may frown upon proposed plans that fail to adopt such state 
requirements, but it has not yet done so.  
In the end, this landmark set of regulations provides a mechanism 
for multi-state transmission operators (RTOs), and FERC, to endorse 
state public policy goals such as RPS standards in transmission 
planning and cost allocation. Once an RTO has considered these as a 
part of its planning process, to the extent it incorporates them into 
future transmission projects and their cost allocation, this can help to 
entrench existing state public policy requirements within a particular 
region. At this point, any state legislature that wished to endorse a 
policy at odds with these priorities, or repeal them, would face higher 
enactment costs (making repeal of RPS standards less likely); for 
example, RPS repeal efforts would face resistance from utilities in the 
state that are members of an RTO that has taken these into account 
(helping utilities to recover the costs of compliance and new 
transmission infrastructure in their rates), and if these are repealed, 
the RTO will now face the potential for overcapacity in transmission 
infrastructure—a cost that would be borne at least in part by 
consumers in that state. Of course, increasing the costs of repeal may 
 
105. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission 
Owning and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000-A), 77 Fed. Ref. 
at 32,216 (noting concerns that regional policies could impact some 
states adversely). 
106. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000), 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 
49,860 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
107. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000-A), 77 Fed. Ref. at 
32,217. 
108. Id. 
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also increase the costs of adopting a policy in the first place, if state 
political actors expect that their policies are more difficult to reverse; 
this might make adaptation more difficult in some circumstances, but 
also can produce accountability benefits by ensuring that state 
political actors have weighed the implications of their policy choices. 
In this sense, by increasing the enactment costs of maladaptation, 
Order No. 1000 may not present the kind of accountability deficiency 
some of its critiques allege. Instead, it can be understood as an effort 
to improve accountability of state policy choices to ensure that 
adaptive federalism measures are more sensitive to the coordination 
benefits that they can produce. 
Conclusion 
In sum, federalism provides space for state politics to encourage 
adaptation, but not all independent state regulation should be 
celebrated as a form of “adaptive federalism.” State climate change 
initiatives provide a fertile example of how adaptation can be effective 
in addressing social problems, particularly where the federal 
government has not adopted comprehensive legislation. However, 
state politics can also sometimes lead to inaction or backlash—forms 
of maladaptation that can undermine adaptive federalism, particularly 
its coordination benefits. This Article does not suggest that this is 
constitutionally inappropriate, or that it should be limited. However, 
what has been described as maladaptation can represent a type of 
inaction or backlash that, at its core, is not consistent with federalism 
in certain regulatory contexts. This kind of maladaptation presents a 
challenge for regulatory policies designed to promote innovation, 
interjurisdictional competition, or coordinated regional approaches. 
Yet most discussions of federalism are generally indifferent to the 
substance of state policy choices and assume any exercise of state 
sovereignty advances federalism values, regardless of the nature of the 
state policy. Maladaptation illustrates how this view is impoverished.  
In some instances, exercises of state power simply cannot be 
characterized as promoting the values of regulatory competition, 
improved interstate coordination, or regulatory experimentation—a 
state political choice can be welfare-reducing (as where the benefits 
are concentrated and the costs dispersed, especially to those outside of 
a jurisdiction), or may not be made in a way that is politically 
accountable (as where positive externalities are ignored). FERC Order 
No. 1000 is an illustration of how federal regulators have tools at their 
disposal that do not preempt the ability of states to make adaptive 
policy choices while also increasing the enactment costs of states 
acting to thwart or undermine the benefits of coordination. 
Ultimately, federalism theories must account for maladaptive 
exercises of state power, and assess how best to respond. This Article 
has argued in favor of federal initiatives that leave states the 
flexibility in policy choices but that are attentive to the enactment 
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costs of states adaptation measures, especially in contexts where 
coordination among states is desirable and direct federal enforcement 
is lacking. I have made an effort to furnish such an account of 
adaptive federalism for one narrow corner of federalism, using energy 
and the environment as an example. To the extent that adaptive 
federalism’s values extend to other areas where subnational 
governance is desirable, the lessons about addressing maladaptation 
may prove useful to understanding the entrenchment of state policies 
in federalism discussions more generally.  
